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This is the first report on a study which we started· 
during a two-year stay (1968-1970) at the Social 
Studies Project.of the University of Cape Coast. It 
deals with the performance of the Ghana Sugar Industry, 
i.e. with the performance of the two projects carried 
out at Komenda and Asutsuare. 
The present report contains very little in the way of 
factual information about the two projects; neither 
does it attempt to present a detailed analysis of the 
many different factors which caused the projects to 
deviate from the original project plans. It tries to 
explain what we had in mind when undertaking this 
study and how our originat ideas had to be adjusted 
after confrontation with the actual project histories 
(Sections 1 and 2). How far all this i9 relevant, 
either to project analysis in developing countries. in 
general, or to future project work in Ghana,.· will be 
discussed in the final part of this report (Section 3). 
The discussions in sections 2 and. 3 already anticipate 
some of our major conclusions. These will be discus-
sed in more detail in subsequent reports, which will 
contain a ·full analysis of the history·of theprepara-
tion,implementation and. operation of the projects over 
the period 1960-1970. . 
The Hague, September ·1972 

1 
o . INTlWlDUC"1':roB 
0.1 The two cases studied: Kommenda and Asutsuare 
The Komenda and Asutsuare Sugar Projects, which are the 
subject of this study, were .both prepared and implemented 
in, the public sector between 1959 and 1966 ,and have been 
in operation as state enterprises sinc~ 1967 and 1966 
respectively. 
The actual performance of these projects has devia-
ted considerably from the plans, estimates and predictions; , 
which formed the basis for their appraisal and the deci-
sion to invest. Both factories were planned to reach 
the:ir full capacity production of respectively 24,000 and 
15,000 tons of sugar p.a. during the third year of opera-
tion, i.e. 1967-6B in the case of Asutsuare and 1968-69 
.in the case of Komenda. 1 Their combined output of 39,000 
tons would then have covered about 55-60% of domestic 
consumption, which over the period 1966-69 stood at an 
average of 70,000 tons p.a. Actual output has, so far, 
remained far below the targets set, for the first years of 
production. During the campaign-year 1968-69 the com-
bined output of the two factories amounted to 4,125 tons, 
i.e. 10-11% 'of full capacity output. , ' 
Comparison of· actual outputs, wi.th capacity outputs, 
and of the latter with the size of the domestic sugar 
market, leads to one fairly obvious conclusion, viz. that 
~, As will ,be discussed in later reports, the capacity output of 
Komenda is often quoted as being 12,000 tons of sugai p.a. The 
'capacity output given here and used throughout the rest·of our 
study, viz. 15,000 tons p.a. is that given in the feasibility 
study of the suppliers of the factory (Eaonomia, Report Regarding 
the Construation of a Cane Sugar Faatory at Komenda, Prague, 1962, 
mimeo). Our reason for using this figure is that the final deci-
sion to go ahead with the Komenda scheme was based--as far as we 
know--on the data given in this report. The explanation of such 
di verse capacity output figures for one 'and the same factory lies 
in the fact that the rated capacity ofa sugar factory can only 
be defined in terms of potential throughput of cane per day (1,000 
tons in the case of Komenda). The output that can be attained 
depends on the throughput per 24 hrs., the percentage of sugar 
recovered from the cane (which was assumed to be about 10%) and 
t.he number of crushing days per season (which was assumed to be 
about 150), with a possible maximum extension to 165 days ,per year. 
Those reports that quote a 12,000 tons ~apacity output for Komenda 
assume a crushing season of 120 days net, a figure which is indeed 
consistently used in all reports on Asutsuare (capacity output 
24,000 tons p.a., Le. crushing capacity 2,000 tons per day, sugar 
recovery 10%, 120 crushing daysp.a.), but which is much lower 
than that used in the above-mentioned report, which departs from 
the estimates in an earlier report of a group of Dutch 'consultants 
(Report regarding the Development of a Cane-Sugar Industry in 
Ghana for the Ghana Agriaultural and Industrial Development Cor-
porations, Amsterdam/The Hague, April 1960). 
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the presence of under-utilised capacity in the Ghana 
sugar industry is certainly not due to tnecreationof 
excess capacity. On the contrary, judged by the mere 
size of demand there wo'uld be scope for extension of 
existing capacities and even for an additional sugar pro-
ject. The target of the Seven-Year Development ,Plan 
1963-64 to 1969-70, namely the establishment of 4 state-
owned sugar factories with a combined capacity 'of 100,000 
tons by 1970 2 was certainly not so unrealistic from the 
point of view of size and prospe'ctive growth of the 
domestic sugar market., 
But to-day, nearly 9 years later, ,the ,same target 
appears of course highly unrealistic if we think of the 
capital and managerial resources which would have been 
needed to build and bring into operation sricce~sfully 
4 large-scale sugar projects over a period of 7 years, 
not to speak of the administrative capacity of ,the govern-
ment agencies responsible for the preparation and the im·· 
plementation and operation of these and the numerous'othE~r 
large-scale projects initiated in the 'public s~ctor'after 
1960. As we shal.l see below, ,bottlenecks in the supply 
side (and more specifically those affecting the managerial, 
administrative and capital resources rrientionedabo'Ve) have 
been the major factors hamperi~g the development of the 
two 'sugar projects which formed the subject of our study. 
Of these scarce resources'capital should in our opiriion 
certainly not be mentioned 'in the first place. Ghana in' 
the early 1960s seems, retrospectively, a classic examplE~ 
of an'economywhich--at least in the public sector--was 
pushing its rate of investment beyond its "absorptive ca·· 
pacity". Not the availability of qapital, but the "ina-
bility, to invest in soundly conce! vee. development programs 
and projects" that can be, carr'ied out well and qperated 
economically upon completion ;'3 appears to have formed 
the :major bottleneck. 4 " " 
2 See Seven-Year DeveZ,opment f?z,an, Accra, October .1973" p.70, 
',Table, 5.2 (p. 103) and Table 5.5' (p. 119). 
3 The definition of "absorptive capacity" used hel;'e is that of ' 
Waterston; vide A. Waterston, DeveZ,opment PZ,anning; Lessons of 
.Expe~enae, Baltimore, 1965, p. 300. 
4 This statement needs to be qualifiE3d in, a n:umber of respects: 
<,1) though it was fairly ea'3Y for Ghana to obtain all kinds of 
suppliers' credit to' finance imported equipm~nt, this was proba-
bly not that easy for the complementary investments needed to 
make use of this equipment; (2) the fact that medium-term debt 
was often used to finance projects with relatively lo~g gestatioll 
periods and the fact that most projects took. a longer time to , 
be completed and to be put 'into operation.' than had peen foreseen, 
led to a drastic reversal of the si tuati,on in the second half of 
the 1960s., During that' pel:1od capital did, indeed become the ' 
great bottleneck (vide pp. 1,3-1,4 below) • 
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0.2 Research objectives 
The major objectives of our study of the two sugar projects 
were: 
a) a detailed reconstruction of the history of the two 
projects, covering the projects' preparation, imple-
mentation and actual operation, i.e. a period of about 
10 years, ahd showing what was originally envisaged 
and what 'actually happened. 
b) an analysis of the factors which had been, or are 
still" responsible for the considerable differences 
between actual and planned performance. 
c) an analysis of the possible relationship between the 
emergenc'e of problems on the one hand and, on' the 
other, the specific structural'characteristics of the 
projects and the int~raction of thes~ with the social, 
political and ,economic environment in Ghana. 
These research questions obviously need further ex-
planation includ~ng a definition of the concepts used. 
We would first like to explain, how~ver, how our study, 
originated. What made us ask these ,questions, what made, 
us choose these two specific projects as the objects of 
our research, and, last but not least, what did we 'expect 
to be the relevance of our research? 
l. ORIGINAL IDEAS AIm HYPOTI:mSES 
Our interest in the two sugar projects was not based on 
the mere fact that both had run into problems. What struck 
us arid made us interested in their histories were {I ) the 
type of problems which both had apparently encountered, 
and (2) the fact that these problems appeared to be fairly 
characteristic of quite a few agricultural processing pro- , 
jects carried out in developing countries. ' 
1.1 KomeIAd.a and Asutsuare: the appareIAt problem of raw 
material supplies 
According to our first and, admittedly, rather imprecise 
information, the poor performance of both projects was 
mainly due' to delays and other problems connected with the 
agricultural aspects of both, i.e. the development of the 
raw material supplies to the factories. Both factories 
seemed to have been completed according to, schedule and 
to be well designed and well adapted to local conditions. 
Neither were there any indications of major difficulties' 
originating from the operation of the factories. There 
were obviously great difficulties in reaching efficien,t 
operation as witnessed by a low to very low sU:Jar recovery 
and a very high fuel consumption, but these diEficultie$ , 
appeared to be due to the insufficient and irregular'sup-
ply of cane and its low averag~ quality rather than to 
problems located in the factories themselves., 
It also became quickly apparent that the development 
of the agricultural parts of both projects had not only 
deviated in time, but also in substance from the projects 
as originally conceived arid accepted for implementation. 
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While the original plans were completely'based, on large-
scale irrigated plantationprq,d,uction, tpe proj~,c,t,s a'?, ' 
actually developed depended partly on plantation canc, 
partly on cane grown by a large number of "outgrowers", 
i. e . individual or cooperati velyorganised farmers.' This 
constituted not only a major change in the organisation 
of production; it also meant a change-over from a rather 
intensive form of irrigated agriculture (the original 
concept) to a less intensive form with ioweryields per 
acre and mainly dependent on rainfall. None of the r~la­
tively small and dispersed " outgrowers" farms had irriga-
tion facilities; neith~r was there any indication ~hat the 
irrigation of these farms might ~ventually be considered. 
The plantations also turned out to depend largely on 
rainfall as the planned irrigation systems had not been 
completed, while those sections that were ready, had hardly 
been utilised. Though the plans for irrigation had not 
been officially abandoned, it seemed that serious doubts 
had been expressed about their economic j:ustlfi,cation. 
While the original consultants had been of the opinion 
that irrigation was indispensable, later consultants 
thought that rather extensive methods of cultivation under 
rainfall alone mign t be more, ecoriomical. 
1 .2 P:robl.ems of agr.:iLcul t1lllJC'al. p:r:ocess.:iLl!D.g' projects: some 
hypotheses , 
We cannot pretend that at the time of starting our study 
(or even now a few years later) we could present hard em-
pirical evidence showing that problems experienced by 
agricultural processing projects carried out in,developing 
countries would 'usually arise from the agricultural:aspects 
of the operations~ What we were certain about, however, 
was that the two Ghanaian projects were ,by no means unique 
cases and that quite a few elements in ,their histories were 
rather a repetition of what had been observed in many simi~ 
lar, projects in many parts of the 'developing world. 
In earlier work we had enjoyed the opportunity of 
almost dai:ly contact with a group of tropical agronomists 
involved in cO,nsul ting work in a variety of tropical coun-
tries and on a wide range of food and industrial crQPs~ 
Through this contact we got 'to know of qui te a few projects 
which, like the two Ghanaian projects, had run into pro- ' 
blems through delays and ,other problems in tl1e d§!yelopment 
of the agriciiCtura:i. raw matE!Jdal supplies. What was even 
more interesting, however, was that most of the accounts 
of our colleagues seemed to imply that agricultural pro-
jects (or agricul,tural parts of mixed projects) were by 
nature more uncertain and more likely to run into problems 
than ind,ustrial (parts of) project's. When they returned' 
from their missions their accounts, though of course dif-
ferent in detail, usually revolved around one or more of 
the following themes: 
a) the high degree of uncertainty in agriculture with 
respect to technology as well as physical and social 
environment; 
b) the "difficul ty" of successfully implementing 'and, 
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operating agricultural projects ( or the agricultural 
parts of mixed projects) ; 
c) the general underestimation of the degree of uncer-
tainty and difficulty in agriculture by those locally 
responsible for the initiation and development of 
agricultural or partly agricultural projects. 
Though these three themes were in the majority of cases 
not explicitly mentioned, the project histories we heard 
were usually replete with concrete examples. 
Uncertainty. Crops sometimes turned out to behave 
qui te differently from what had been expected on the basis 
of experience elsewhere under what had been considered 
more or less similar conditions. This resulted sometimes 
in poorer results than had.been expected, someti~es· in 
better results, e.g. a crop doing quite well without irri-
g'ation, while rainfall figures would have indicated a so-
lution with irrigation. In the same general category were 
also the examples of poor results or unnecessary expendi-
ture incurred due to the recommendations of consultants 
with wide experience elsewhere, but which had been acquired 
under conditions different from those in the area con-
cerned. An indication of the general degree of uncertainty 
was finally the fact that our colleagues were sometimes 
the "n"th expert called to advise on a new projector on 
the problems of an already implemented one. The type or 
uncertainty discussed varied with the nature of the pro-
ject. Examples of uncertainty related to the social en-
vironment figured most prominently.in the discussio"n of 
projects for the introduction of a new crop or new methods 
of production amongst a large number of traditional 
farmers. 
~ifficulty. The relative difficulty of implementing 
and operating agricultural projects 'as 'compared to indus-
trial projects was often stressed, especially in the case 
of projects which, like our two sugar projects, combined 
agricultural and industrial (processing) activities. As 
outsiders, i.e. as non-agronomists, we were indeed often 
impressed by the examples given: the importance of time-
liness in agricultural operations and the relatively high 
penalties resulting from non-timeliness in the form of 
lower yields, lower quality of crops or higher costs; the 
exacting requirements. of a large-scale processing unit 
as to regularity, quantity and quality of raw material 
supply, demanding a highly organised form of agriculture 
with relatively high requirements with respect to mana-
gerial and technical ~now~how; the large number of varia-
bles in agricultural production and their complex inter-
relationships. 
Underesti.mmation of degree of 1llIllD.certainty and Cliffi-
culty. It seemed that in most cases the manufacturing 
for example of sugar or palm oil', i. e. the processing of 
crops in factories was seen as a new and unknown activity, 
meriting detailed study by foreign consultants and de-
manding initial management and supervision by expatriate 
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personnel and.cl number of years 0:1; training of local 
managers,· supervisors and operators. The development of 
the raw material supplies to the factories appeared on 
the other hand in many cas<:s to be seen as much less pro-
blematic or, in the more extreme cases, as something which 
would take care of itself. The presence of a wild-growing 
variety of a particular crop (or the c~ltivation of a 
local variety by local farmers) seemed often to be taken 
as a sufficient indication that conditions were favourable 
for the growing of a commercial crop. That economical 
processing or the quality of the end product will often 
demand the cultivation ,of specially bred varieties with 
different soil or climatical requirements or different 
susceptibili ty to diseases and pests', was a point which'--
understandablY enough for us--was not always fully appre-
ciated. The same lack of appreciation was noticed in 
regard to the. special character and skill requirements of. 
agricultural operations which are closely geared to large-
scale processing units, which, for the optimal utilisa-
tion of expensive capital installations,. demand close in-
tegration of'agricultural arid processing operations during 
the stage of implementat:i.on as well as actual operations. 
What we hqped to find '-*it through a detailed study of 
the history of the two Ghanaian sugar p~ojects was there-
fore: . 
a) how far the substantial deviations from plans and ex-
pectatio,ns were in these two cases indeed related to 
the uncertainties and special difficulties which seemed 
to have played such an important role in many other 
agricultural or partly agricultural projects in devel-
oping countries; 
b) the precise nature of these uncertainties and difficul-
ties'and the distinctive'features of agricultural pro-
jects or agricultural processing projects underlying 
these. ' . 
1.3 The .JID.ai.ture ot our exercise: .a stwiy OJID. project 
Per:lfor.mm.an.ce 
What we had in mind was a'study of project performance, 
i.e. 
1. an analysis of the factors which ha.d caused actual 
outcomes to differ from plans ,and expectations, 
and' 
2. an analysis of the possible relationships between 
these differences and the projects' major struc-
tural characteristics, both being agricultural 
processing projects of a specific type. 
This implied that the question whether the projects should 
have been selected for implementation, i.e. could be con-
sidered "worthwhile", on the basis of the available infor-
mationor could be considered the "best" from the set of 
available alternatives, is not explicitly considered. 
What we were interested in was the quality of the infor-
mation on which decisions were based (the predicted out-
comes), rather than ,the question whether the decisions 
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were rational, given this information and the decision-
maker's criteria. This means of course that a humber of 
interesting and relevant questions about the projects will 
not be dealt with. We ,may clarify this with an example of 
such a question, one that in Ghana was often brought up 
in discussions about the two sugar projects. 
It was often argued that instead of locating one 
project in the Central Region (Komenda) and another in 
the Lower Volta area (Asutsuare), it would have been 
"better" if both projects (or only one bigger unit) had 
been established in the latter area, which seemed to have 
the best conditions for sugar production. It was also 
argued that concentration of sugar production in one area 
would have offered more scope for further industrialisa-
tion~ased on the utilisation Df by-products {e.g. paper 
and cardboard manufacturing from bagasse), while one 
large unit would moreover have led t6 the realisation of 
economies of scale in processing. It is indeed quite 
certain that the alternative of concentrating in one area 
was never considered. It may also w~ll be that this al-
ternative would have been a "better" choice, though a 
judgment on this point would lead us of course into'the 
thorny problem of speculating about the criteria which 
were applied at the time the decisions were made. S ' 
A more general point is that the measures cif'profi-
tability applied in evaluating the projects were certainly 
not of the type which would lead to socially efficient 
choices. What was used was in the best case a simple 
measure of private profitability. There are therefore 
indeed reasons to assume that the decisions to select the 
two sugar projects (and for that matter many other public 
sector projects in Ghana) were non-rational, i.e. repre-
sented a choice from among the discovered alternatives 
which did not maximise the decision-maker's pay-off func-
tion" while the discovered alternatives only const.ituted 
a small subset of the possible alternatives. 6 What 
5 Though concentration of 'sugar production in the Lower Volta area 
might well have resulted in lower costs per unit of output, i.e 
in a larger net contribution to national income, there are no 
reasons to assume that the latter was the Ghana Government's only 
criterion for deciding about projects. There are indeed some 
indications that the choice of the Komenda project was also re-
lated to a policy, admittedly vaguely formulated, of "bringing 
industries to the Regions", and therefore also served the objec-
tive of a more equitable distribution of development over the 
different regions of the country. 
6 For a classification of economic decision models according to the 
degree of rationality in the behaviour of the economic agent, see 
K. J. Cohen and R. M. Cyert, Theory of the Firm: Resource. Alloca-
tion in a Market Economy, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, p. 308. Though 
the focus of this book is on the role of business firms in the 
resource allocation process, much of it and especially Part 3 
(New Approaches to the Theory of the Firm') seems highly relevant 
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interested us, however, was not the degree of rationality 
of the decisions, but the fact that these were obviously 
based on expected outcorrteswhich for one reason'or the 
other were not borne out by the projects' actual perfor-
mance. 
Why we chose to concentrate on performance and the 
problems ·of i tsprediction may already be 91earfrom' the 
way in which our study originated. The point will be ' 
more fully argued in section 3.1 below, when' discussing 
the relevance of our exercise. 
2. CONFRONTATION WIm llmALI.".fY 
The preceding sections have provided an outline of the 
basic ideas we had when we started our study.. Actual con-
frontation.with the two projects and our first attempts at 
an analysis showed a number of factors which we had ,over-
looked or whose importance we had underestimated. 
2.1 Inadequate preparafo:i:y work. vs . inadequate 
imp1ementation ' 
As possible causes of observed differences between ,actual 
and planned project performance we had been mainly aware 
of possible inadequacie~ or uncertainties in the informa-
tion and the predictions on which the decisions had been 
based. 
While expectation~ aboul a project's costs' and bene-
fi ts and, consequently, about i ts "v~orthwhilenes's" or pro .... 
, fi tability (however measured) are based on: 
a} technological information: the different, combinations 
of inputs that will result in certain quantities of 
output; 
b) anticipations or forecasts, relating to the future 
'course of variables outside the control of the de(!ision-
maker: availability of inputs in certain quantities and 
qualities at certain prices ,and at certain times, the 
possibility of selling certain quantities of output at 
certain prices and at certain times; and 
c) ariticipat'ed future actions of the decisibn ..... make:r: him-
self: investment, impl(:!mentation and production sche-
dules and budgets; 
we had been mainly thinking of errors and uncertainties 
in a) and b) as possibleexplanc;:ttic:in for the deviations. of 
actual from planned performance. What we had inore or less 
assumed was that if it had been decided to implement the 
projects, anticipated future actions c) would have been 
translated into actual actions. This assumption turned 
out to be far from realistic: in neither of the two cases 
is there any close correspondence between what was en-
viaaged and what was actually done. The major characte-
ristic of both projects appeared to be that 'they had not 
for the study of the role of other economic agents, e.g. governments, 
in the resource allocation process. 
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been implemented according to plan, that they had entered 
into operation when they were only partially completed, 
and that a'fter entry in to operation the means to acquire 
the necessary inputs to operate the projects were not ' 
always available in the right quantities and at the right 
times. This meant that our enquiry acquired a distinctly 
different slant from what we had originally envisaged. 
vvhat we had thought would become a study of inadequacies 
and uncertainties in the information used for making pro-
ject decisions, becarne--because of the nature of the two 
specific cases studied--much more a study of how this in-, 
formation was used (or not used) in actual decisions and 
the implementation of these. This does not mean that in-
adequacies and un6ertainties in the prep~ratory studies 
could not be studied or would not have played some role. 
It became only more difficult to j udsre to what extent 
these had been or were stilk playing a role. Comparison 
of e.g. actual cane yields (20-30 tons per acre) with 
estimated yields (40-47.5 tons per acre) does obviously 
tell us little about possible errors or uncertainties in 
the original estimates" when actual yields have been ob-
tained largely without irrigation, without an adequate and 
timely supply of fertilisers and without a very large in-
put of expertise, all of which were assumed to be made ' 
available in the original studies. 
2.2 Dependence on 1oca1 raw material supplies as a major 
factor 
We were interested to find out how far the projects' 
problems and shortfalls in performance were related to 
their major structural characteristics. We had tended to 
see the latter,however, as mainly determined by the fact 
that both were partly ag'l'iauZtu'l'aZ projects ,depending for 
their success on the development of local supplies of an 
ag'l'iauZtu'l'aZ rCM material. The whole idea of undertaking 
our study had in fact originated because we hoped that a 
study of these two projects might tell us more about the 
uncertainties and vulnerability of agricultural projects 
and agricultural processing projects in general. 
We fairly soon realised that the mere.fact that·both 
projects by their nature had to depend on ZoaaZ raw mate-
rial supplies was a second distinctive structural charac-
teristic. If a project involves the processing of a raw 
material which by the nature of the process (a substantial 
reduction in weight or bulk) or by its own nature (perish-
apili ty) has to be produced in the vicinity o'f the pro-
cessing unit, the production of the raw material and its 
processing have to be studied and executed as integrated 
parts of one project. 7 A sequential solution, e.g. 
7 This is an example of complementary investments and more in par-
ticular of the extreme case where each of the complementary in-
vestments. is a prerequisite of the other. Vide H.Bierm;;m,Jr.& S.Smidt, 
S. Smidt, The CapitaZ Budgeting Deaision, 3rd ed., London, 1971, 
pp. 77-81, for a brief discussion of economically dependent in-
vestments and their administrative implications. 
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starting with processing of imported raw materials, fol-
lowed la,ter by backward,linkage into raw materialproduc-
tion is impossible. Neither would it be possible'to start 
with raw material production' for exports, to.be followed 
later on by forward Linkage to the processing stage. It 
is clear that this holds good, independent of' th'e n.ature 
(agricul.tural or non-'agricultural) of the raw material in 
question. 
This may appear to be so self-evident that it ,hardly 
needs stressing. That it is not will he borne out by, the 
histories of, the Komenda and Asutsuare projects, of which 
the raw material producing and the processing components 
have been (and in certain respects are still bein'g) treated 
as more or less independent. That they were neither the 
first in this respect is shown by Killick's brief account 
of the history of a few earlie.r. Ghanaian ventures based· 
on local raw material·supplies. 8 Ki-llick's·concl:usion is 
well worth quoting: 
The lesson to be learned from these examples is not that local ma-
terials are ,inferior. or inevitably unreliable but that when a project 
is planned on the basis of local raw material supplies ,the source of 
supply must, for plann'ing purposes, be treated as part of,the project 
itself. To treat these two aspects as even semi-independent is t09 invi te trouble, as has been found in a number of other projects." 
2 . 3 The dominance of' environm.enta1 conditions 
What we had certainly underestimated was the extent to 
which the histories of th~ two projects had been determined 
by the specific traits of the socio-economic and political 
environment'in which they had been prepared and implemented 
and were l::>eing operated. ,We had become interested in the 
uncertainties and difficulties of a specific group ,of pro-
jects (agricultural. and agricultural processi'ng projects) 
carried out in "developirigcountries". This means that we 
had a certain environment· in mind. We had also realised. 
that, while the uncertainties and "difficulty" of this type 
of projects might be related to their specific strlictural 
characteristics, the actual emergence of problems would be 
largely conditioned by certain traits of this environment. 
The latter we tended tO"see, however, as a number of 
general conditions, which would be fairly cOnimon to devel-
opingco:untries, including ,Ghana. The high degree of un-
certainty in agriculture might be partly connected, we 
thought, with th~fact that agriculture is closely bound 
to nature, that prediction of the relationship between in-
puts and outputs therefore demands information about quite 
a few elements of the physical environment (rainfall, 
relative humidity, temperature, hours of su~shine, their 
8 See W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E.N. Omaboe (eds) , A Study of 
ConterrrpoY'a:ry Ghana, Vol. I, The Economy of Ghana, Chapter 12, 
"Manufacturing and Cons'truction," by A.J. Killick, p.' 291. 
9 Ibid. ' , 
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variations throughout the year ahd their variability. from 
year to year, soil conditions, etc.), while this info~ma­
tion (lik~ many other types of information) is relatively 
scarce and unreli~ble in developing countries. Given its 
special information needs and given the general lack of . 
this information, predictions about outputs might there-
fore more often prove to be wrong in agriculture than in 
manufacturing, where the technical relationship between 
inputs and outputs is in most cases hardly influenced by 
differences in physical environment. 
The fact that agricultural operations usually have to 
meet deadlines imposed by nature--crops have to be planted 
before a certain time, fertilisers to be applied within 
.certairi time limits, while the growing of a crop cannot be 
speeded up by applying a larger dose of inputs over a given 
time interval--means that in agriculture a high premium is 
put on timeliness (or a high penalty on non-timeliness) as 
compared to manufacturing activities. This means in 
turn relatively high requirements with respect to manage-
rial skills as well as to the regular and timely availabi-
lity of inputs, and consequently a relatively high propen-
sity to run into trouble in an environment where the ful-
filment of these requirements is rather uncertain. 
These examples will be elaborated and others will be 
added when we go into the actual project histories. The 
reason why we have brought these up here is that th~ in-
fluence of these more general environmental traits on the 
performance of the two sugar projects appeared to be com-
pletely dominated by certain traits in the environment 
which 'were specific to Ghana during the 1960s, i.e. during 
thE;! period relevant for our study. 
2 . 3. 1 The general economic situation in Ghana 
The first and most general of these environmental factors 
was. the gradual deteriora,tion of the general economic 
situation as a result of severe balance of payments pro-
blems. Large increases in expenditure on imported con-
sumer and producer goods'and a more or less stagnant level. 
of 'export proceeds led to a rapid depletion of foreign 
exchange reserves, which were quite substantial ~t the 
time of independence (1957), but were more or less ex-
hausted at the start of the Seven-Year Development Plan 
1963/64 to 1969/70. 10 Import and foreign exchange con-
trols, introduced in 1961 to curb the rising trend in 
balance of payments deficits and gradually tightened in 
the, following years, did not only lead to a scarcity of 
imported consumer goods, but also made their impact felt 
10 See for example Birmingham et aZ~ Ope cit., Chapter 14, 
"External Trade" by A.J. Killick, pp. 357 ff. 
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in domestic production, at least in those sectors--and 
these form the majority--whichdirectly or indirectly 
depend on imported raw materials, semi-finished products, 
equipment and spare parts. 11 ·The actual restrictions'in 
the quantities of imports were moreover not the only 
factor creating problems for utilising or maintaining 
existing productive capacity. The meTe introduction of 
elaborate administrative controls and the way in which 
these were operated also led to a much more irregular flow 
of imported commodities, which after the depletion of 
initially still available stocks manifested itself in a 
succession of periodic shortages. From 1964 onwards under-
utilisation. of existing.and often just newly c.reated capa-
city because of lack of raw materials, and breakdowns in 
existing capacity because of maintenance problems, became 
a regular feature of the .Ghanaian economy. 12 An important 
part of the history of the two sugar proje.cts , viz. that 
of their implementation and entry into operation, turned 
11 In fact no sector of the economy remained unaffected in the long 
run.. Even the production of local foodstuffs for the market, 
. which in i tsel.f demands hardly any foreign inputs, was affected 
viz. through the gradual deterioration of infrastructure and 
transport facilities. See R.M. Lawson, "The Markets for Foods 
in Ghana," in E. H. Whetham and J . I. Currie (eds) ,Readings in 
the Applied Economics of Africa~ Vol. I~ Micro-Economics, 
Cambridge, 1967, p. 175. 
12 A major source of information on this and other periods are the 
Economic Surveys, published annually by the Central Bureau of , 
Statistics, Accra. These do not only contain excellent factual 
information, but throughout the years have maintained a high 
standard of objectivity and.candour in discussing and criticising 
the results of government policies and their administration. The 
first references to shortages of consumer goods and raw materials 
and to the "bottleneck that developed in the administration and 
.issue of import licences" can b~ found in the Economic Survey 
1963, which, however, does not yet mention any repercussions on 
domestic output apart from those in the private puilding and con-
struction industry (Op. cit., paragraph 58). How quickly the 
situation deteriorated is shown by the Economic SurVey 1964, 
which mentions that "most of the manufacturing enterprises expe-
rienced many difficulties during the year in obtaini~g import 
licences for their raw material requirements and spare parts,". and 
Eltates that "It has not been possible yet for those responsible' 
for the issue of licences to evolve a machinery that will enable 
the industrial s.ector of the economy to be provided with its allo-
,cation of foreign currency at the appropriate time. As a result some 
of the establishments have had to run at less than optimum cap~city 
fo~ certain periods of the year •• .. " (op. cit., para. 285). 
The Economic Survey 1965 shows that in that year the value of 
gross manufacturing output increased by only 0.8% in real terms 
as compared to 23% and 8% in 1963 and 1964 respectively; this 
notwithstanding the maintenance of a high level of investment in 
new capacity over a number of years (op. cit., paragraphs 83 and 
282 ff.). "The main cause of this stagnation was the system of 
import licensing which did not function as smoothly as was re-
quired with the result that most manufacturers were unable to 
satisfy their requirements of raw materials and spare parts." 
(op. cit., para. 282). 
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out, therefore, to lie in a period in which the perfor-
mance of all kinds of productive units, in the public as 
well as in the private sector, in the directly productive 
sectors as well as in supporting services and infrastruc-
ture, became increasingly conditioned by constraints on 
the national economy as a whole. 
What is even more important is that these constraints, 
which initially mainly affected the utilisation and main-
tenanceof installed capacity throughout the economy, in 
the second half of the 1960s, also resulted ina drastic 
curb on all investment activity, thereby not'only affect-
ing the undertaking of new, but aiso the completion of 
already partially completed projects, such as the two 
sugar projects. In the early 1960s the level of investment 
in .the public sector had been increasingly financed by 
large-scale foreign borrowing, which to a large extent 
took the form of short to medium term suppliers' credits, 
and resulted in the rapid accumulation of a huge foreign 
debt. The fact that short to medium term debt had in ' 
many casepbeen used for projects which would have required, 
long-term finance and the fact that the shortage of foreign 
exchange in itself led to longer than normal gestation 
periods and underutilisation,of newly created capacity made 
it increasingly difficult for the Government to meet the, 
rapidly rising external debt servicing charges. 13 
The NLC Government which came into office after the 
overthrow of the Nkrumah Governmen't in February 1966 was 
forced to postpone the servicing of the foreign debt and 
to introduce a policy of consolidation, reducing conside-
rably the level of domestic,investment in order to bring 
national expenditures into line with currently available 
resources. This policy, which a'imed at the better ,utili-
sation of previously made investments, i.e. at development 
with relatively little new investment following a period' 
of II investments without development"jl4 did indeed improve 
the situation slowly and gradually, but, could do so only 
to a limited extent. A policy of austerity in import 
licensing resulted in major improvements in the balance of 
payments on current account for the years 1966 and 1967, 
while a shift in the composition of imports towards raw 
materials, spares and'machinery started to alleviate the 
13 The Economic Survey 1965, which was published after the coup of 
February 24, 1966, is the first to provide a more or less reliable 
picture of the Central Government's indebtedness. (Op. cit." 
paragraphs 109117.) It shows that the sharply increased external 
debt consisted of 82.5% of suppliers' credits and points out that 
these credits--with repayment periods of 5-6 years--were amongst 
others used to finance physical and social infrastructure projects 
with long gestation periods. 
" 
14 See TWo-Year Development Plan" From St~ilisation to Development: 
A Plan for the Period ~d-1968 to Mid-19?O, Accra, 1968, pp. 7-8. 
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major constraint which had held back the utilisatton of 
domestic productive capacity in almost all sectors of the 
economy. Shortages of imported raw materi'als, spare parts 
and complementary capital goods continued nevertheless to 
be a major factor well into 1968,15 while the prospects 
of moving back to a more adequate level of investments 
before the end of the decade remained extremely bleak be-
cause of increasing debt servicing charges following the 
resumption of debt servicing in 1968. How bleak the 
picture was to remain in this respect was clearly bra'ught 
out in the Two-Year Development Plan for the period mi.d-
1968 to mid-1970which stated that "the level' of new aid 
including IMP drawings (net) and suppliers' credit will 
hardly suffice to offset the servicing of existing debts 
and repayment of short-term arrears. In othe'r words, no 
net inflow of· resources from abroad can be expected from 
these items over the Plan period. "16 
This was then the situation in which our two projects 
were implemented (or not implemented) and had to start 
their operations-':"a situation in which the near-breakdown 
of the economy as a whole was such a dominating factor . 
that our study of the performance of two individual pro- , 
jects tended to bring out more aJjout these environmental 
constraints . than about the special uncertainties and dif-
ficulties of the specific type of project studied. While 
we had started off with the idea of a study on the perfor-
mance of agricultural and agricultural processing projects 
in a developing country,.it became gradually blear that· 
our final product would lean m0re heavily towards a study 
of' project performance in Ghana during the 1~60s. While 
looking for the general we were more and more confronted 
with the specific, at least with regard to the projects' 
environment. As will be shown later a fair amount of 
general points can still be brought out with respect to 
the projects' characteristics and'the uncertainty and vul-
nerability related to these. While all projects in Ghana--
whatever their type-.;..were adversely affected by the coun,-
try's general economic situation the highly dispiriting, 
experience with the two sugar projects and indeed a number 
of other agricultural projects are certainly attributable 
to some of these projects' special characteristics. 
2.3.2 The organisation of the public sector 
A second specific trait in the projects' environment of 
which we initially underestimated the importance is rela-
ted to the political-administrative environment in which 
both projects have been implemented and are being operated. 
While the deterioration of the country's general 
economic situation caused a disruption of the orderly flow 
15 Op. cit." p. 52. 
16 Ibid. p. 12. 
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of capital and current inputs to all economic activities, 
whether in the private or public sector, the performance 
of the public sector was moreover conditioned by one 
more important constraint, viz. the administrative capaci-
ty of the agencies responsible for the implementation and 
operation of public sector projects. Considering the 
whole complex of factors covered by this· blanket term, i. e. 
considering not only the quantity of staff available and 
its qualifications but also the organisation structure . 
of the public sector and the rules and procedures governing 
its actions, conditions appear to have be.en prohibi ti ve 
for the maintenance of the required flow of resources to 
the two sugar projects and--for that matter--to all· the 
numerous other projects initiated in Ghana's public sector 
during the first half of the 1960s. 
We shall not yet go into details here as our subse-
q\lent reports will contain extensive references to this 
particular complex·of factors. That the raw material pro-
ducing·and processing components of both projects have 
been treated as more or less independent--asalready 
pointed outabove--is just one example of the way in which 
the histories of the projects were influenced by· the fact 
that both belonged to the public sector. That this 
happened can only be explained by the fact that the organi-
sation of the public sector fo.llowed .the traditional mi-
. nisterial and departmental structure of Ghana's civil. 
service, in which agriculture and industry belonged to the 
·domains of different ministries. An effective machinery 
for coordination did not exist and proved to be very dif-
ficult to create after the need for it had been recognised. 
Much of what has been said above about the dominating 
influence of the general economic situation on the 
projects' performance could be repeated .here with respect 
to the political-administrative environment. Our study 
of the performance of two individual projects tended to 
bring out more evidence of the constraints affecting all 
public sector projects in Ghana than of the specific un-
certainties and difficulties which we thought to be 
inherent in the type of projects studied and on which we 
had originally intended to focus our attention. In the 
hierarchy of decision-making within the public sector our 
attention shifted, moreover, gradually from the project 
level to higher levels of decision-making, or to put it 
'in geographical terms from Komenda and Asutsuare to the 
centre, i.e. Accra. It became gradually clear to us that 
much of what had happened at Komenda and Asutsuare during 
implementation as well as actual operation had been 
largely determined by decisions at the centre, decisions 
which in many instances had moreover been. made ina 
rather uncoordinated fashion with respect to the projects' 
different components. 
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The fact that in the case of the two projects studied 
shortfalls in performance appeared to be mainly due to 
environmental constraints some of which affected all 
economic activities while others affected, in particular, 
the public sector does not of course invalidate Qur ori-
ginal hypotheses about the possible relationship between 
these shortfalls and the particular structural characte-
ristics of the. type of projects studied. It only means 
that the history of the two cases studied .made empirical 
verification of these hypotheses more difficult. An 
analogy may serve to clarify this point. If.of t.wo crops, 
A and B ,crop A is more ~esistent (less sensitive) to . 
adverse weather conditions (e.g. periodic drought condi-
tions) than crop B, this will be clearly reflected in 
yield differentials in years with periodic droughts. Not 
or mucp less so, however, in years with prolonged droughts 
or with adequate rainfall throughout the year. In the 
case of the two sugar projects environmental conditions 
were adverse to such an extent that they--.in terms of the 
analogy just used-"':could be characterised as approaching 
prolonged drought. All economic activities were affected 
and all projects showed delays in construction and entry 
into operation and shortfalls in performance during actual 
operation. 17 Only in so far as the two sugar projects 
could be shown to have even poorer records than most other 
public sector projects'would it be possible to relate 
performance to project characteristics. The detailed and 
extensive information which would be required for a sys-
tematic inter-project comparison makes this a well-nigh 
impossible task at least within the scope of this study. 
There is, however, one easily observable point on which 
the history of the two sugar projects compares rather 
unfavourably with most manufacturing projects carried out 
in the public sector during the same period. While the 
latter showed in quite a few cases a rather rapid recovery 
after their ailments and those of the economy in general 
had been diagnosed and treatment started, the cases of the 
two sugar projects'and indeed of a few other agricultural 
processing projects have been dragging on endlessly with 
only slow and minor improvements. 18 This is the more . 
17 An important and notable exception was the Volta River Project. 
Important because of its being the largest single project in 
Ghana's history. Notable because all the factors which negatively 
affected other public sector projects (fragmentation of responsi-
bility over different agencies, the consequent problems of coor-
dination, dependence on annual budget allocations, etc.) did not 
affect this project which was executed and is operated by a semi-
autonomous body, the Volta River Authority. The creation of an 
organisational structure best suited to carry out and operate a 
project successfully--an aspect which was long neglected in the 
case of other public sector projects--was in the case of this im-
portant project not neglected. See for example "Ghana: the Volta 
River Project" in J.A. King, Jr., Economic Development Projects 
and Their Appraisal, Baltimore, 1967, pp. 128~155. 
18 Notable examples are 3 fruit and vegetable processing projects', 
which after a 7-8 year history were about to be commissioned in 
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striking as there has been no lack of diagnosis of the 
projects' troubles, as we found out already soon after 
starting our enquiry. It only seemed that·something in 
the. nature of the projects made it more difficult to over-
come these troubles. The internal organisationalcharac-
teristics of the public sector and the more general con-
straints affecting the economy as a whole seemed to remain 
insuperable barriers to a rapid improvement, notwith-
standing reforms in the former and a gradual improvement 
of the latter. 
Much of our work bears, of necessity, a descriptive 
character. In order to be able to answer our main research 
questions we had to attempt a rather detailed reconstruc-
tion of the two projects' histories, while the dominant 
influence ;of certain environmental factors also forced us 
to look far more and much further outside the projects' 
boundaries than we had originally envisaged. We see these 
descriptive parts, however, as being subsidiary to the 
explanatory part of the study. Our major aim was not to 
wri te . a piece of micro-economic history or to paint a 
picture ·of the way in which the Ghanaian economy and, more 
in particular, its public sector developed under the in-
fluence of the policies initiated by the Nkrumah Govern-
ment. What we really hoped for was that the analysis of 
the experience with the two Ghanaian sugar projects' would 
provide at least some results which would be useful in the 
preparation, evaluation and implementation of future pro-
jects. In discussing the relevance .of our research we 
shall therefore mainly concentrate on the question in 
which respects and to what extent the outcomes might con-
tribute to the improvement of future project work. 
'That we have deliberately limited our study to an 
analysis of project performance, comparing predicted with 
actual outcomes, already indicates that we are mainly 
dealing with questions related to the preparation and 
implementation of projects. We shall have little to con-
tribute to questions of project evaluation and project 
choice in developing countries, i.e. to such issues as 
the use of shadow prices, which have been and still are 
subject of wide discussion. Why we have chosen to con-
centrate on project performance and its prediction, rather 
than on questions of "allocative efficiency" is the first 
point to be taken up .in this section. A second point is 
to what extent a study, dealing only with two projects of 
a certain type carried out during a particular phase in 
1970. See The AnnuaZ Estimates for 1969-?O~ Part I, Vol. IV, 
Accra, July 1969, p. 11 and Ghana's Food Industries 1968; an 
Economic AnaZysis by E. Reusse, FAO/UNDP, Accra, April 1968, 
pp. 90 ff. 
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one country's history, will be relevant to future project 
work ingeneral:-;,A-third-and- -fin-aI-point Ti:f -the~reTevance 
of the study to Ghana, namely, how far can our findings 
contribute to the improvement of future project work, more 
in particular to that in the public sector, and how far 
will these findings still be useful to further improvement 
in the performance of the two projects studied? 
The order in which we shall deal with these qUestions 
has not been chosen arbitrarily. It indicates that, all 
the time, we have been looking for the general, of course 
within the limitations imposed by a study of two particular 
cases. 
3.1 The relevance of ex-post evaluation 
The process of reaching an investment decision is a spe-
cific example of the more general process of choosing 
between alternatives. In this process two vital steps can 
be distinguished viz. (1) predicting the consequences of 
alternative actions and (2) distinguishing preferred com-
binations of consequences from less desirable ones, a 
step which entails the use of criteria. 19 
In the large body of literature on project appraisal--
alternatively christened project analysis, cost-benefit 
analysis, investment planni~g, capital budgeting, etc.--
the second step has received by far the most attention. 
Much of the discussion has' centered round the choice and 
application of investment criteria and the closely related 
questions of valuation and enumeration: which prices 'are 
to be used in the valuation of costs and benefits and 
which consequences, i.e. which costs and benefits, are to 
be included in the appraisal? An example which is of 
special relevance to project appraisal in developing coun~ 
tries is the discussion on social cost-benefit analysis, 
which aims at measuring a project's contribution to 
national economic objectives and which entails thevalua-
tionof inputs and outputs at "accounting" or "shadow" 
prices and the inclusion of external effects in the esti-
mation of costs and benefits. 20 
The relevance of the discussions on social cost-
benefit analysis (and on other more general topics such 
as the treatment of uncertainty, problems of capital 
19 Cf. R.N. McKean, Efficiency in Government through Systems 
Analysis3 New York, 1958, p. 27. 
20 See for example I.M.D. Little and J.A. Mirrlees, Manual of In-
dustrial Project Analysis in Developing Countries3 Vol. II3 
Social Cost Benefit Analysis, OECD, Paris 1969. The Bibliography 
(op. cit., pp. 269 ff.) contains a selection of the most important 
publications in this field from the early 1950s onwards. 
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rationing, indivisibilities and project interdependence) to 
project appraisal in developing countries cannot be 
denied. There is, however, some room for skepticism 
about the immediate impact which the introduction of 
social cost-benefit analysis could be expected to have on 
the "quality"21 of investment decisions in developing 
countries. This skepticism is not based on the fact that 
"the subject is not one where techniques are fully 
accepted"22 or on the unavoidable time lag between the 
developmen·t of new techniques and their general applica-
tion. On· the contrary, these last two points would in 
themselves constitute forceful arguments for giving high 
priority to the further development and introduction of 
these .techniques. The fundamental reason for our skep-
ticism is of a quite different nature and is based on the 
relatively heavy emphasis which appears to be placed on 
refinement and improvement of evaluation methods and 
techniques (step two in the decision-making process) at 
the relative neglect of improvements in the first step 
(predicting the consequences of alternative actions). It 
would appear, to put it in plain terms, that the state of 
knowledge about the methods and techniques of project 
evaluation and selection has got out of line with the 
state of knowledge about the behaviour of projects in 
developing countries, i.e. with the knowledge necessary 
for predicting the consequences of the implementation and 
operation of projects, including the risks and uncertain-
ties which are inherent in these predictions and in the 
assumptions on which these are based. At the risk of 
overarguing our case, we would like to repeat that this 
is not an argument against social cost-benefit analysis. 
The only point we want to make is that there is more to 
making "correct" or "good" decisions about. the undertaking 
of new projects than a correct translation of basic per-
formance estimates into a measure of a project's social 
profitability, indicating its expected contribution to 
national economic as well as non-economic objectives. 23 
21 In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding it should perhaps 
be pointed out that the term "quality" as used here only refers 
to the "correctness" of a decision given the decision-maker's 
value system. It only refers to the question how far.a decision 
actually contributes to maximising whatever one wants to maximise. 
22 Little and Mirrlees, Ope cit., p. 7. 
23 Taylor distinguishes three conditions which have to be met for 
a decision to be "good" or "correct": "It is possible to determine, 
at least within limits, whether the alternatives considered were 
those mctually available, whether the consequences anticipated 
were those which in fact would have ensued, and whether the choice 
made was the one to be preferred, given the individual's value 
system. If all of these conditions were met, then the decision 
may be said to have been 'good' or 'correct'." See D. W. Taylor, 
"Decision Making and Problem Solving," in R.M. Cyert and 
L.A. Welsch (eds) , Management Decision Making, Penguin Modern 
Management Readings, Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 34. 
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Comparison of actual outcomes of projects in develop-
ing countries_with anticipated- outcomes seems to point to 
recurrent weaknesses in the basic information on which 
decisions have been based, as well as to defects in the 
process of decision-making itself, i.e. in the way in which 
this information is used in' arriving at actual decisions 
and in implementing these. In a report of a symposium on 
industrial project evaluation which was held in 1965 
attention was drawn to "the frequent disparities in many 
developing countries between the project as evaluated and 
the project as implemented and operated. "24 Hirschman in 
his now well-known analysis of a number of IBRD-projects 
says, when discussing the possible bias in his sample 
because of the exclusive reliance on World Bank projects: 
Fortunately (at least for my research!) I found, upon looking more 
closely, that not one of the projects I had selected had been free 
of serious problems. It became quickly apparent to me that all 
projects are problem-ridden; the only valid distinction appears to 
be between those that are more or less successful in overcoming 
their troubles and those that are not. ,,25 
Within Glana the Komenda and Asutsuare projects which are 
the subject of this study, are not isolated examples 
either of projects troubled with serious problems. 26 Our 
own confrontation with project experience in the field 6f 
agriculture and agricultural processing (see pages 4-6 
above) and more general discussions with colleagues about 
agricultural development and agricultural policies had 
gradually led us to see the problems of decision-making 
in developing countries and particularly in the agricul-
tural sector a$ problems of predicting the outcomes of 
alternative actions (investment decisions, policy measures), 
or to put it the other way around, as problems of finding 
out how to achieve certain accepted goals. Analysis of 
past project histories, as attempted in this study, might 
give us;..-we hoped--some indication of the· type of factors 
which contribute to the frequent disparities between 
anticipations and actual outcomes in projects carried out 
in developing countries. Careful assessment of these 
factors in future projects ·might lead to more realistic 
24 Report of the Interregional Symposium on Industrial Project 
Evaluation, Prague, Czechoslovakia, 11-29 october 1965, United 
Nations, New York 1966, para 143. Selected studies presented at 
the Symposium were published separately as: Evaluation of 
Industrial Projects, UNIDO Project Formulation· and Evaluation 
Series, Vol. I, U.N., New York 1968 •. 
25 A.O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed, Washington C.D., 
1967, pp. 1 and 3. 
26 We have not yet made a systematic effort to collect and analyse 
information on the many other projects carried out in Ghana over 
the past 10-15 years. For the time being we can only refer to 
the accounts of Killick and Reusse, which were already mentioned 
above (vide footnotes 8 and 18). 
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estimates of project performance and to a more explicit 
enumeration of all the cOhditions that would have to be 
fulfilled, both wi thin and outside a project's: boundaries,. 
to ensure its successful implementation and operation. 
The above is of course 'nothing more than ian argument 
for the usefulness of· carrying out a "post-m0rjtem" or . 
ex-post evaluation study, 27 'which is what our Istudy of the 
two Ghanaian projects actually amounts to. I~ is interes-
ting to note that over the past two or three Yiears the' 
need for more continuous and organised "ex-posit evaluation" 
worki' in contrast to hitherto isolated efforts ~uch as' 
ours ,. has become increasingly accepted in the :circlesof 
aid and project administrators. A recent pap~r by . 
Cracknell gives an excellent summary of the delvelopments 
in this field and of the plJ.rposes and problemsi of ex-post 
evaluation. 28 It distinguishes two major funqtions, viz. 
( 1) the management function, i. e. the organiseld "feedback" 
of data and ideas to improve the preparation, '!evaluation 
and implementation of future projects and (2) !the audit 
function. The former, which is learning from past project 
experience to improve further project work, isl the major 
objective of the present study, as has' been ou1tlined 
above. 
, 
3.2 The· relevance to other projects I 
The, analysis of only two specific projects--asl carried out 
in this study--will obvious ly not yield all th'e factors 
which may be relevant to 'project behaviour in Ideveloping 
countries. Among the factors found to be relevant to the 
two cases studied, there will also be quite a few which 
are of little or no relevance to projects of a, completely 
different nature or carried ,out in a differen~ socio-
poli tical environment. It:iis, however, not ne:cessary to 
put too much stress on these rather obvious lihiitations. 
In So far as our analysis sticceeds in explainirig the be~ 
haviour of the two projects iin terms of their ~ifferent 
structural characteristics and the interaction! of these 
with specific traits of the ,socio-political environment, 
the relevance of our findings can be extended ,to a much 
wider group of projects, vii. to all those which share at 
least one of these characteristics, and to a m~ch wider 
group of environments, viz. 'all those which sh!~re at least 
one of these traits. In the case of the sugar, projects 
one such major characterist:ijc is, forexample'i the fact 
that their successful implementation and opera~ion demands 
. i I I 
27 We must admit that we knew neither of these terms when we started 
our study. The first. one has'this quality that it ~ccurately' 
reflects the type and. nature of the work involved, viz. careful 
and patient dissection. It suggests, however, wrongly, that the 
patient is dead which may be, but is not necessarily the case. 
The second and more respectable term now seems to be generally 
accepted. 
28 B.E. Cracknell, The Purposes and Problems of Ex-Post Evaluation~ 
paper read at the Nuffield College Oxford Conference, Sept. 1971, 
mimeo. 
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coordination of component project activities belonging to 
di f fere!l t __ ?e_c:: :t9_rs _ oJ_t::he_~90DQI!1Y 1in __ this __ c_as_e agriculture __ 
and industry)'. This characteristic and the fact that 
responsibility for government activities in these and 
other relevant sectors traditionally rested with different 
ministries account for quite a few of the'problems expe-
rienced with the the Ghanai~n sugar projects, as was 
mentioned above (see page 1~)., We shall discuss these 
problems, namely the disintegration of both projects into 
a number of separate projects, executed in a largely un-
coordinated fashion by different government agencies, 
more extensively in later reports. At this stage ,we merely 
want to point out that the relevant project characteristic 
fits a much wider range of projects than those analysed 
in this paper. The problems which were experienced in 
this respect with the Ghanaian sugar pr.ojects would appear 
to be relevant to all proje9ts which either demand a high 
degree of vertical integration (like the sugar projects) 
or are of the multiple-purP9se type and therefore demand 
close coordination of compo~ent activities cutting across 
traditional fields of professional and administrative 
responsibility. This is notito say of course that,all 
projects which share this characteristic will necessarily 
experience the same problemS, or, if they do, experience 
them to the same degree as the two Ghanaian sugar projects. 
It only means that these projects, for their successful 
implementation and operatio:J;l, require the fulfilment of , 
certain conditions such as closelY,coordinated management 
of different component activities, and are consequently 
liable to run into trouble if the particular environment 
in which they are situated cannot meet these requirements. 
The'government agencies responsible for public sector 
projects in Ghana could not, as probably many of their 
counterparts in developing as well as developed countries 
if faced with the responsibility for a type of activity, 
which fell largely outside their field of experience and 
which moreover would demandlact:lon and reforms which would 
be contrary to established +~les and procedures' and to the 
values traditionally attached to these. 
The practical relevance of all this to the judgment 
of future projects should be obvious. A sound judgment' 
on any new project would demand (1) identification and 
explicit enumeration of conditions which have to be met 
for the project to perform as, laid down in preparatory 
studies, and" (2) an explicit judgment of-' the likelihood 
that these conditions can .be, m~t"by th'€! pa:rticular envi-
ronment in which it will be'situated. 29 
29 This is exactly what most project studies omit to do. They are 
usually full of implicit, i. e,. hidden assumptions and therefore 
hardly ever fulfill'the second condition. Uncertainty, the 
treatment of which gets much attention in literature on project 
evaluation, is hardly ackno~ledged in the majority of project 
studies. Vide P.D. Henderson, "Investment Criteria for Public 
Enterprises," in R. Turvey (ed) , PubZic EnteY'pY'ise, Penguin 
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It became therefore a major aim of our study to find 
out which particular confi'guration of project characteris-
tics and environmental traits explains the behaviour of 
the two sugar projects. ~uch an analysis is essential if 
an ex-post evaluation study is to contribute significantly 
to the improvement of future project work. The many ways 
in which actual project p~rformance in developing coun-
tries may (and doeS) deviate from the basic estimates in 
feasibility reports are already fairly well known,30 even 
though published evidence iseems on the'whole rather 
scarce. While a mere description of past project expe-
rience might lend further :support, for example, to the 
statement that "despite exceptions, it has been the rule 
in developing countries that projects take longer to 
complete than is allowed for in the project report,"31 
this information is in itself not very helpful. In order 
to improve future estimates of, for example, construction 
periods by specifying the assumptions about the environ-
ment underlying these esttmates and testing these assump-
tions against, the actual characteristics of a new project's 
environment, one would like to know which environmental 
traits have been insufficiently aIbwed for in past projects 
and to find out which projects are more vulnerable in this 
respect or are subject to:a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty. 
To the best of our knowledge Hirschman was the first 
to point out the importance of recognising the "connections 
Modern Economic Readings, Harmondsworth 1968, pp. 135-136, which 
states that ". •• it is remarkable how often project analyses 
present single values for prospective costs and benefits, with 
little indication that the :outcomes depicted may not be realized 
and with no consideration of the likelihood and characteristics 
of other possible outcomes.'" (Ibid., p. 136). The absence of 
an explicit enumeration of :environmental conditions and of an 
acknowledgement of the uncertainty in these may not be that serious 
in project analyses for projects in developing countries, where 
e.g. performance estimates ,will be largely based on past expe-
rience in more or less similar conditions, and where the "hidden 
assumptions" stand a good chance of being quite close to reality. 
The situation is of course completely different in developing 
countries where the environment is unknown to the majority of 
those involved in making project studies and where many of the 
relevant characteristics of the environment are also unknown in 
the sense that little information is readily available. 
30 See for example Little and Mirrlees, Ope cit., .pp. 16-18, where 
this problem is fully acknowledged and a number of quite common 
deviations are mentioned. 
31 Ibid., p. 17. 
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between the technical or economic characteristics of 
projects and- t~2ir-performance -in.:d-ifferentsoc-io-political 
environments". We would. he·~e.'~~l.ke to acknowledge our 
intellectual debt to Hirschman's book which was published 
late 1967 and which we were lucky to receive only a few 
months after having started our work on the two Ghanaian 
projects. Though from the outset of our work we had en-
visaged an analysis which would bring out the special 
vulnerability and difficulties of a specific group of 
projects, sharing certain structural characteristics, the 
formulation and further development of our ideas owe much 
to Hirschman's stimulating and origina:j. analysis. 
3.3 The relevance. to Ghana 
3.3. 1 Solution of. immediate prab1ems VB improvement of futuze project 
work 
It is not without a certain amount of diffidence that we 
.approach the question of relevance with respect to the 
projects themselves. Our main reason for this follows 
logically from the nature of our study, which is to look 
backward, trying to explain what has gone wrong and why, 
rather than formulate recommendations to improve the si-
tuation in which both projects found themselves. Though 
the one does not preclude the other, our study of the two 
sugar projects tended by its nature to yield more results 
relevant to future projects, than findings which would be 
immediately useful to decisions on .the operation and 
further development of the projects themselves. Many of 
the problems experienced by both projects belonged to the 
past, i.e. were bygones which as such could no longer be 
corrected and were therefore no longer relevant to deci-
sion-making. Though they had been responsible for the 
waste of resources and therefore had negatively affected 
the projects' "overall performance", they could no longer 
influence the projects' future course. A good example of 
a problem which lies in the past. is the delay in the com-
pletion of the water supply system for the Komenda factory, 
which caused the factory to stand idle for more than a 
year after it had been completed and was otherwise ready 
. for· operation .. In so far as the analysls of this parti-
cular delay pOints to delays in starting the particular 
activity (constructiop of water supply) ~ue to current 
administrative rules and procedures or .the administrative 
capacity of the agencies involved,· this might in the short 
run be taken into account when scheduling future public 
sector projects, e.g. by introducing longer "lead times" 
for obtaining approval and actual disbursement of funds. 
It might in a somewhat longer/time perspective point to 
reforms in administrative (e.g. budgetary procedures) or 
to a strengthening of the agencies involved •. In so far 
32 Op. cit. I p. 6. 
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as the delay was due to delays in the actual execution of 
the activity, this might be taken into account in the 
estimation of "activity durations" and in the scheduling 
of similar activities in future projects, or lead to 
action to increase the availability of· those resources 
which appeared to have formed bottlenecks in the past. 
All this is certainly relevant but only to future 
projects and not to the two projects studied. If we are 
somewhat diffident in stressing the relevance of this type 
of findings, it is therefore not because of any doubt 
about their relevance but rather because the situation in 
which we found ourselves: a situation in which the need 
for analysis of the immediate problems at hand (what should 
be done about the two projects?) often seemed to be much 
more glaring than the need for "learning lessons from the 
past". To all those directly involved in the projects 
whom we contacted in the course of our research...;-officials 
at the ministries, local managers at the project sites, 
small farmers and village cooperatives growing cane for 
the factories--the relevant question was, for obvious 
reasons, "what should be done?", a question to which our 
study could only contribute in a number of minor ways, 
while we moreover lacked the technical knowledge and the 
experience which are needed to arrive at detailed recom-
mendations. 33 
33 The sort of dilemma created by competing demands for analysis 
in immediate support of decision~making and analysis to improve 
the long-run quality of decision-making is probably symptomatic 
of any situation where--as is the case in many developing coun-
tries--the necessary analytical skills are still in short supply. 
It is the dilemma faced by the senior planning adviser, who under 
the pressure of circumstances, finds himself drawn into the 
minute detail of day-to-day decision-making, contrary to his 
job-description as well as to his own judgment of the type of 
work he most usefully could perform. It is also the dilemma faced 
by university departments, which often find some of their most 
able. staff members absorbed by work on government advisory com-
mittees which consequently diminishes their capacity to contri-
bute in the way of long-term research. It is in short a dilemma 
which more often than not tends to be resolved in favour of the 
immediately felt needs, which may explain the low priority which 
in the developing countries has so far been given to ex-post 
evaluation, but certainly does not justify this low priority. 
In the case of Ghana one cannot help being struck by the repeated 
occurrence of problems which might have been avoided if decision-
makers had had the benefit of analyses of past experience. That 
the history of the two sugar projects. was in certain respects 
a mere repetition of,that of earlier ventures based on local raw 
materials (see p. 10 above) is a case in point. That the 
relative neglect of ex-post evaluation is universal and not re-
stricted to developing countries is shown by Cracknell's discus-
sion of the relatively poor record of aid-donor agencies in this 
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It is true that our comparison between actual and 
planned ·performance also served to identify (and explain 
the origin of) quite a few problems in the actual opera-
tion of both projects, i.e. in recurrent activities 
which--unlike past problems of implementation--are still 
susceptible of improvement. It is, however, needles to 
say that to identify a problem and to e~plain its occur-
rence is something quite different from formulating de-
tailed proposals for its solution. To perform the latter 
function one needs the specialised technical knowledge 
and experience of the consultant, a role which w~ could 
not and did not intend to perform. One of the problems 
which has continually played a rather central role in the· 
actual operation of both projects is, for example, that 
of the supply of seasonal labour for harvesting. It is 
a problem that even during the most recent campaign 
(1971/72) has not been solved and is largely responsible 
for the irregular and insufficient daily supply of cane 
to the factories and for the prolongation of harvesting 
beyond the optimal season. It is a problem which is not 
difficult to identify and which in recent periods has 
received wide public attention, amongst others through 
the spectacular mobilisation of large groups of students 
to participate in harvesting the cane. It is also a 
problem whose origin is not difficult to asc~rtain at 
least for th~ purposes of our study. It is an example of 
an aspect of the projects which has hardly received at-
tention in the original project studies, or--to put it in 
another way--aboutwhich too easily assumptions were made 
in arriving at performance estimates. 34 To arrive, however, 
respect (~p. cit., paragraphs 7 and 16) and by Haveman, who with 
respect to public investment in the United States has pointed out 
that "Only very recently has.· it been possible to find any sig-
nificant research at all that focuses on the economic results of 
public undertakings after they have had the time to develop a 
performance record." S~e R.H. Ha~eman, The Economic Perfomance 
of PUbZic Investments: An Ex Post EvaZuation of W~ter Resources 
Investments, Baltimore and London, 1972, p. 1. 
34 In the case of Komenda it. appears that all estimates were·based 
on the tacit assumption that seasonal labour could be easily 
recruited locally, i.e. in the near vicinity of the project site, 
and--being unskilled--could be recruited at the minimum daily 
wage rate. Though the original consultants considered the 
availability of labour to be an important factor and certainly 
.had some doubts about this assumption, there are no indications 
that this matter was ever seriously studied. Their very first 
report, which examines seven possible locations within the then 
western Region (comprising the area of the present western and 
Central Regions), already mentions the availability of labour as 
one of five important locational factors. (See Interim Report 
Sugar Survey Ghana, Amsterdam, September 1959.) The m~jor con-
clusion of this report, viz. that "of the areas considered only 
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at a reasonable recommendation for a long-run solution 
of this problem one would have to know the alternative 
manual and mechanicaT methods available for the different 
operations involved, such as cutting and loading, be able 
to provide reasonable estimates of' the investment and 
current costs of the alternatives available and of their 
physical performance, assuming the availability of ,manage-
ment and supervision with a certain level of technical 
expertise and experience.' 
A different but closely related pOint is finally that 
as far as the identificati·on of the projects I problems was 
concerned little could be added that would throw an en-
tirely new light on the situation. There had certainly 
the one situated east of the RiverPra appears at present to 
justify further detailed investigations" (ibid.) is, however, 
mainly based on consideration of the other locational factors, 
viz. availability of water for irrigation and processing, extent 
and topography of available areas, soil quality and climatic 
conditions. The report's recommendations for further detailed 
investigations in this area, which roughly covers the preserit 
project area, also mention only the characteristics of the phy-
sical environment. The reason given is that "the authorities 
have assured us that in Ghana wherever there is a demand 'there 
will be a plentiful supply of labour" (ibid.). That the con-
sultantshad nevertheless some doubts about this point is shown 
b~ their second report which is the first major report on the 
Komenda location and presents its findings and recommendations 
under the proviso that "the availability and willingness to 
learn of a sufficient labour force in Komenda State tally with 
the reports received" (Report regarding the Development of a 
Cane-Sugar Industry in Ghana, Ope cit., Summary of Findings and 
Recommendations, point 21). The final report of the same group 
,of consultants reports positively on the results of two trial 
plots which were the subject of another proviso in the main report 
(see: Final Report regarding the Development of a Cane-Sugar In-
dustry in Ghana for the Ghana Agricultural and Industrial Develop-
ment Corporations, Amsterdam/The Hague, January 1961). The 
proviso with regard to the labour situation was apparently re-
tained. As far as we know there were no further investigations 
into this aspect by the same or by later consultants. 
The basic studies on the Asutsuare area contain little on the 
labour situation, while going into considerable detail on tech-
~ical agronomic matters (see: Report on Survey of the Lower Volta 
River Flood Plain, Vols. I-V, FAO, Rome, 1963). Though it is 
stated that "labour required by s:ugar plantations and a factory 
will have to be drawn largely from outside the region'" (ibid. , 
Vol. V, p. 8), the reports do not go into detail about possible 
ways of recruitment or about the provision of facilities for 
seasonal labour. Given the nature of these reports, this could 
hardly be expected. Contrary to the studies on Komenda, which 
deal with one project for one crop only, the studies on the Lower 
Volta area had a much wider purpose, viz. to investigate the po-
·tentialities for irrigated agriculture in the Lower Volta River 
Flood Plain. Sugar was only one among the many other crops that 
are considered in these reports. 
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been no lac::k oJ~_ d~_i::lgno_§J_E? g:£"the~ p):'()je_ctl?~'~ t:t:'olll:>I~13 ~as 
was already. pointed out above (see p. 16/17).. Between 
the middle of 1967 and 1968 extensive reports became 
available, which were prepared independently by two large 
consulting firms with a '!fong-standing reputation in sugar 
cane cUltivation and proce~s~ng and contained detailed 
recommendations for future action. 35 Als'o the Reusse 
report, referred to earlier contained a section on the 
sugar industry.36 Between them these reports had already 
identified most of the problems facing the projects, while 
some of these ~roblems had already been' identified at an 
earlier stage. 7 What we could contribute in the way of 
identifying problems was therefore mainly the addition of 
some detail and extension of the analysis over a ~SightlY 
longer period than that covered by these reports. What 
struck us indeed more and more during the course. of our 
enquiry was the amount of expertise that had already gone 
into analysis in support of further decision-making and 
the little use that apparently had been (or could be) made 
of it to improve the projects' performance. We shall deal 
with this point more extensively in our actual analys~s 
and in the following section,· where we, shall discuss a 
more or less similar situation with respect to somE: of our 
other findings. 
35 The first report to appear was that resulting from a brief survey 
undertaken in May 1967: A Report on the Sugar Industry in Ghana 
and its Development, Bromley, July 1967. The same consultants 
were later on commissioned to prepare a more detailed study, which 
'was completed in 1968. The second major study was that undertaken 
by the Development Service Institute of the National Investment. 
Bank, Accra: Evaluation. 'Report State Sugar Produats Corporation, 
Accra, September 1967. Appendix 1 of this report, containing 
the detailed technical studies and the recommendations of the . 
consultants, was separately bound and dist:iibuted as: An Evalu-
ation of the Sugar Industry in Ghana~ prepared fop the National 
Investment Bank, Accra, September 1968. 
36 Gp. ait., pp. 47-59. 
37 See e.g.: Report of the AgriauZtural Committee of the National 
Liberation Counail, Accra, November 1966, paragraphs 22-24 and 
181':-184. 
38 More work has been going on in recent years. Shortly before 
leaving Ghana in July 1970 we learnt ofa research project to be 
undertaken by ISSER, University of Ghana, Legon on the sugar in-
dustry in Ghana. In the meantime a first report has been 
published, dealing with the demand side: Struature and Prospeats 
of the Sugar Industry in Ghana~ Vol. 1~ Demand for and Supply of 
Sugar in Ghana with Projeations of Demand, by C. Q'Loughlin, 
S.J. Mabey and K. Asiedu-Saforo, ISSE~, Legon 1972. Another recent 
enquiry into the Ghana Sugar Industry is finally that of a World 
Bank Mission, which visited Ghana in 1971 in connection w:i,th an 
application for a loan to rehabilitate and further develop the 
sugar industry. 
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3.3.2 Problems of planning and public sector organisation 
Of special relevance to Ghana are of course those findings 
that relate the projects' performance to specific traits 
in, their environment. It was already mentioned that some 
of these environmental characteristics turned out to play 
a much larger role in the history of ' the projects (and 
consequently in our study) than we had originally suspec-
ted (see pp. 10~l1). Much of the projects' performance 
appeared to be a reflection of the performance of the 
economy as a whole and more in particular of that of the 
public sector to which both belonged. While trying to ex-
plain the shortfalls in performance of two individual 
projects, we increasingly stumbled across factors related 
to national planning, i.e. to decision-making at higher 
than project level, and factors related to the organisa-
tional structure of the public sector and to the rules and 
procedures governing. its ·actions. The fact that certain 
environmental factors played such a prominent part in the 
project histories diminished to a certain extent the 
general relevance of the two cases to future projects of a 
similar type; we found it certainly difficult to verify 
some of our original hypotheses about the relationship 
between shortfalls in performance and the particular struc-
tural characteristics 6f the type of projects studied.' The 
same fact enhanced, on the other hand, the relevance of ou~ 
study to Ghana: quite a few of the factors which influenced 
the performance of the two sugar projects did likewise in-
fluence that of completely different projects, especially 
of those in the public sector, though not always' to the 
same extent or ov.er such a prolonged periOd. 
What struck us again, however, was. that many of the 
deficiencies in planning and in the organisation ~nd 
management of·the public sector which we were able to 
identify had been known to exist for already quite a long 
time, indeed for such a long time that they could have 
been, and in fact had been, identified in advance as po-
tential problem areas. The section on plan implementation 
and management of the Seven-Year Development Plan 1963/64 
to 1969/70 had already stated that "the new tasks in 
economic growth outlined in previous sections make it im-
perative to institute some major changes in the machinery 
of Government to enable it to control economic development 
efficiently. "39 This section of the Plan as well as 
Oma,boe's chapter on the "Process of Planning" in A Study 
on Contemporary Ghana, Volume I40 show that already in 
the early 1960s senior Ghanaian planners were keenly aware 
of the factors which had hampered earlier.planning efforts 
and of the high priority which should be given to creating 
an effective m~chinery for formulating and implementing 
development plans and projects. 
39 Ope cit.p. 283 •. 
40 Birmingham et al~ Ope cit., chapter 18, pp. 439-463. 
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We were .therefore again faced by the fact that at 
least part of our findings were not new but more or less 
a confirmation of what had been said before, and, what is 
even more important, had been said at a time when most of 
what we describe had yet to happen. While the 1968 reports 
of the consul·tants, referred .to in the previous section, 
had indicated what should be done to correct past mistakes, 
the writings of the the~ Executive Secretary of the 
Planning Commission and of the then Government Statisti-
cian had already indicated in the early 1960s what should 
be done to prevent many of the problems that would arise 
in the following years. . 
That we put so much stress on the fact that much of 
what we found out was already "known" i.s not because of 
false modesty. The major reason is that notwithstanding 
this knowledge so little had been or could be done to 
correct or prevent problems. The further we progres'sed 
with our enquiry the more we were faced with the question 
why so little had been or could be done about problems' 
which were known to exist or had been identified in advance 
as potential problems. 
This question is not easily answered and will have to 
be dealt with more extensively in later reports. At this 
stage we merely want to point ou.t that the answer will 
probably have to be sought in two broad groups of distinctly. 
different factors. The first·group is related to the pro-
cess of decision-making and more in particular to the flow 
of information, i.e. the extent to which information that 
is available in reports etc. is actually known to decision-
makers and taken into account in decision-making. In the 
course of our enquiry we .could not help being struck by 
the amount o.f information that seemed to get lost in Ghana, 
either physically or through the impossibility of re-
trieving information that was ·physically available. Reports 
did get lost, while others seemed to lead a hidden life 
unknown to those who would have benefited most from their 
factual contents. A situation which again had not gone 
unnoticed in the Seven~Year Development Plan, but had ap-
parently shown little or no improve~ent in the years that 
followed. 41 If it is true that many of the things we found 
ou.t were. already "known", i. e. had been said or written 
before, it was certainly not so that all this was known to 
the agencies which in one way or the other were responsible 
for the sugar projects. The degree to which responsibility 
had been fragmented over a number of agencies was Qertainly 
a cause for extra complications in this respect. 
41 The chapter of the Seven-Year.Development Plan on Plan Implemen-
tation and Management devoted a separate section to problems of 
information. It mentions, inter aZia, "the difficulty to obtain 
information which exists" and pointed out that "some agencies have 
had to discuss policy when little was known factually about the 
thing or situation which their policY was designed to modify, im-
prove or create." (Op. cit., p. 284.) 
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The second group of factors explaining the lack of 
corrective or preventive action may be found in the 
projectS' socio-political and economic environ!llent. It 
comprises those environmental characteristics that are 
negative attributes in terms of the projects' performance, 
but have to be accepted as temporarily unchangeable. 
These are in Hirschman's terminology "traits" that have to 
be "taken", i.e. have to be accepted as given factors when 
designing a project or formulating a development plan, in 
contrast with those characteristics which can be considered 
"as subject to and ready for the kind of changes that are 
required for making a success.of the project", i.e. "traits" 
that can be "made".42 There are--to put it in plain 
words--things that cannot be do.ne, and of which it would 
be unrealistic to assume that they can be done. All the 
reforms and changes in the machinery of government which 
were outlined in the Seven-Year Development Plan as pre-
requisit·es for its successful implementation,43 at the same 
time show that the plan was unrealistic or overambitious. 
The fact that problems are identified or foreseen does not 
mean that they .can be corrected or prevented •. In s6 far 
as the shortfalls in project performance were indE?ed due 
to neglect at the preparatory stage of environmental 
traits or a misjudgment of the extent to which these could 
be changed; there is I by definition, little scope· ,for 
corrective action in the' sense'. of steering the projects' 
back to their predetermined paths. There remains indeed· 
only one pqssibility, viz. to adjust the pr.ojects'design 
as well as possible to these "new" facts. 
42 See Hirschman, Ope ait., pp. 130 ff. 
43 Gp. ait., chapter 14. 

